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Abstract. The case of corporate financial statement fraud committed by company management 
is a phenomenon that often occurs and occurs repeatedly. This condition is exacerbated by 
the involvement of external auditors to support the fraud. This study aims to determine the 
effect of corporate governance and audit quality and find out the ownership concentration 
moderating corporate governance and audit quality. This study uses moderated regression 
analysis and research samples on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2017-2018. The results of the study stated that corporate governance did not 
affect audit quality, and the presence of ownership concentration strengthened the effect of 
the effectiveness of corporate governance on audit quality. The implication of this research 
is to minimize earnings management practices. The effectiveness of corporate governance 
expects to run well and regulate the composition of ownership into something fundamental 
to implement.
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Abstrak. Kasus kecurangan laporan keuangan perusahaan yang dilakukan oleh manajemen 
perusahaan merupakan satu fenomena yang sering terjadi dan terjadi berulang-ulang. 
Kondisi ini diperburuk dengan adanya keterlibatan dari auditor eksternal untuk mendukung 
kecurangan tersebut. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh corporate 
governance dan kualitas audit serta mengetahui adanya konsentrasi kepemilikan memoderasi 
corporate governance dan kualitas audit. Penelitian ini menggunakan moderated regression 
analysis dan sampel penelitian pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa 
Efek Indonesia pada tahun 2017-2018. Hasil penelitian menyatakan bahwa corporate 
governance tidak berpengaruh terhadap kualitas audit dan adanya konsentrasi kepemilikan 
memperkuat pengaruh efektivitas corporate governance terhadap kualitas audit. Implikasi 
dalam penelitian ini adalah guna meminimalisir praktik manajemen laba maka efektivitas 
corporate governance diharapkan dapat berjalan dengan baik serta mengatur terkait 
komposisi kepemilikan menjadi sesuatu hal yang sangat penting untuk dilaksanakan.
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The case of corporate financial statement fraud committed by company management 
is a phenomenon that often occurs and occurs repeatedly. This condition is exacerbated by 
the involvement of external auditors to support the fraud. There are many cases of financial 
statement fraud involving the role of external auditors, the latest case in Indonesia which 
shocked the economic community, especially capital market investors in Indonesia, is the case 
of PT. Garuda Indonesia Tbk. Management of PT. Garuda Indonesia Tbk with KAP Tanubrata 
Sutanto Fahmi Bambang & Partners (Member of BDO International) recorded a net profit of 
USD 809.85 thousand. After an evaluation, it learns that there was collaboration between PT 
Garuda Indonesia Tbk and PT Mahata Aero Teknologi, wherein this case PT Garuda Indonesia 
Tbk recorded revenues in the form of receivables of USD 239,940,000. Of this amount, USD 
28 million of which is the profit sharing that should pay by PT Mahata Aero Teknologi.
The involvement of auditors to support the practice of fraudulent financial statements 
by company management reduces the quality of the results of audits conducted by the 
auditor. Audit quality is a possibility (joint probability) where an auditor will find and report 
violations that exist in his client’s accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981).
A good corporate governance organ is needed to limit the possibility of poor audit 
quality (AlQadasi & Abidin, 2018). Cadbury (2000) states that corporate governance is a set 
of regulations governing relations between shareholders, company managers, creditors, the 
government, and other internal and external stakeholders relating to their rights and obligations, 
or in other words, a system that directs and controls company. Good corporate governance 
experts to ensure that there is no misuse of company resources for personal or group interests 
can provide proper incentives for shareholders and management to achieve goals that are in 
the interests of the company and shareholders and must facilitate effective monitoring, thereby 
encouraging companies to use resources more efficiently (Adams et al., 2010).
Corporate governance expects it can minimize agency problems that occur between 
interested parties in the company (CGPI, 2001). Good corporate governance can minimize 
information gaps that occur from all stakeholders. Corporate governance emphasizes the 
principles of transparency, accountability, independence, accountability, and fairness 
encourages information disclosure for all parties, thereby minimizing the loopholes for 
company management to commit fraud to increase their prosperity (Ejeagbasi et al., 2015),
However, the implementation of corporate governance conducted by companies is 
more limited to the fulfillment of government regulations (Bédard et al., 2004). Therefore, 
effectiveness needed in implementing corporate governance. The effectiveness of corporate 
governance is a measure of success in meeting or achieving a set of goals related to company 
success. There are several components to realize the effectiveness of corporate governance, 
namely board size. Larger board size will be more valuable because of the breadth of member 
knowledge and its ability to provide more services and resources (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 
2010). Board independence, plays a significant role in increasing the effectiveness of 
corporate governance (Carcello et al., 2002). Board meetings reflects the effectiveness of the 
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expertise, reflects their ability to fulfill their supervisory roles effectively (Wu, 2012), has 
strong governance (DeFond et al., 2005), and provides adequate financial reports (Aggarwal 
& Samwick, 2006). Besides, the effectiveness of corporate governance can form from the size 
of the audit committee; there is a positive relationship between the size of the audit committee 
and its effectiveness. Size, independence, financial expertise, and frequency impact the audit 
committee meetings (Kikhia, 2014).
Companies with effective corporate governance motivate management to implement 
corporate governance principles for the better. The high level of control and supervision arising 
from the effective management of corporate governance narrows the management of companies 
to commit fraud on the financial statements they compile. The existence of excellent supervision 
from directors and commissioners allows individuals in the board not to dare to take individual 
actions to commit fraud (Al-Thuneibat et al., 2011). Also, large audit committees with a financial 
capability make it difficult for company management to manipulate financial statements 
(Abbott & Parker, 2000). This condition is due to effective internal control of the many audit 
committees that exist and accompany by right financial expertise. Frauds of financial statements 
are easy to find and control when the audit committee has excellent financial expertise. Besides, 
high independence in the audit committee makes it possible for the audit committee to work 
professionally, making it difficult for company management to influence the audit committee 
to smooth the financial statements they make (Abbott et al., 2003).
The effectiveness of corporate governance that occurs within the company has an 
impact on improving the quality of financial statements produced by company management 
(Iqbal et al., 2019). The resulting financial statements are prepared through a series of strict 
control and supervision processes so that these processes can minimize the irregularities that 
occur, and the financial statements can be following the real conditions that occur. The lack 
of irregularities in the financial statements makes it easier for external auditors to conduct 
audits so that the quality of audits produced by external auditors is of good quality due to the 
minimal possibility of irregularities committed by the company (Hassan et al., 2014).
Research conducted by AlQadasi & Abidin (2018), and Awadallah (2018) provides 
empirical evidence that the effectiveness of corporate governance has a positive effect on audit 
quality. AlQadasi & Abidin (2018) and Awadallah (2018) state that companies with strong 
governance mechanisms are more likely to demand extensive external audit and pay higher 
audit fees as a representation of high audit quality. These results indicate that the effectiveness 
of corporate governance requires external auditors to be able to produce good audit quality 
in order to provide justice for all stakeholders.
Efforts by company management to implement effective corporate governance to 
produce good audit quality require support from shareholders. Shareholders, as the owner 
of the company, are expected to be able to carry out a good supervision process, so that 
the implementation of effective corporate governance can run well (Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001). Therefore, the form of concentration of corporate ownership contributes to the 
effective implementation of corporate governance. The concentration of ownership states 
the distribution of company share ownership (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Share ownership 
concentrate if most shares own by a small number of individuals or groups so that these 




shareholders have a relatively dominant number of shares compared to others. Share ownership 
needs to spread, and if share ownership spreads relatively evenly to the public, no one owns a 
vast number of shares compared to others (Dallas, 2004).
The distribution of company stock ownership also influences the company’s management 
decisions. The owner, because there are rights, owns this in every company activity. The 
existence of these rights affects the process of policy decisions in the company. Ownership that 
concentrates on one individual or group makes it possible for owners to impose their will on the 
management of the company to improve their welfare so that the resulting policies tend to harm 
other shareholders. This has an impact on increasing agency conflict between owners from the 
high ownership gap in companies with concentrated ownership (Henry, 2010).
To realize effective corporate governance accompanied by strict supervision and control 
mechanisms, this can realize well if ownership concentration can distribute evenly (Gama 
& Rodrigues, 2013). Evenly distributed ownership allows each owner to have an equal 
opportunity to determine the policies that apply in the company. Equitable distribution 
of ownership encourages equal supervision by the owner of the company’s management so 
that the possibility of a coalition of individual owners and shareholders to commit fraud on 
the financial statements can minimize. Besides, evenly distributed ownership creates strong 
supervision among fellow owners so that agency conflicts between owners can be resolved 
(Gama & Rodrigues, 2013).
 Research conducted by AlQadasi & Abidin (2018) provides empirical evidence that 
ownership concentration moderates the effect of corporate governance effectiveness on audit 
quality. AlQadasi & Abidin (2018) shows that companies with a high concentration of 
ownership tend to demand lower audit quality than companies with a low concentration of 
ownership. Then companies with strong governance mechanisms are more likely to demand 
extensive external audits and higher audit quality. Companies with a low concentration of 
ownership show that the impact of the effectiveness of corporate governance on audit quality 
has a more substantial influence than the effect of the effectiveness of corporate governance 
for companies with a high concentration of ownership. The equation in this study is to look 
at the influence of internal corporate governance on audit quality, and the role of ownership 
concentration in increasing the influence of internal corporate governance on audit quality 
that will produce.
The rise of phenomena related to fraud in the company’s financial statements motivates 
researchers to further study the importance of improving audit quality of each report produced 
by the company. The absence of a quantitative approach that is certain to measure audit quality 
encourages researchers to study it in terms of the management of accrual earnings contained 
in the company’s financial statements. Companies with high accrual earnings management 
in their financial statements indicate as a form of poor audit quality produced by auditors 
due to earnings deviations from their proper conditions (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & 
Subramanyam, 1998). In addition, the dualism of perspective related to the ideal ownership 
structure in the company in order to improve company performance motivates researchers 
to study the form of ownership concentration to encourage the creation of the effectiveness 
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shareholders over minority shareholders creates a gap in the coercion of the interests of the 
majority shareholders on company management so that the coalition between them can 
reduce the quality of financial statements.
Besides, the dualism of perspective related to the ideal ownership structure in the 
company in order to improve company performance motivates researchers to study the 
form of ownership concentration to encourage the creation of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. Agency conflict between owners due to the dominance of majority shareholders 
over minority shareholders creates a gap in the coercion of the interests of the majority 
shareholders on company management so that the coalition between them can reduce 
the quality of financial statements. Therefore, the researcher seeks to examine how evenly 
distributed ownership can increase the effectiveness of corporate governance in order to 
minimize all potential agency conflicts that occur so that the quality of financial statements 
increases and ends in increasing company performance.
Methods
This research classifies as descriptive quantitative research using a research approach, 
namely associative research. The population of this research is Indonesian manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Furthermore, this study uses a 
purposive sampling method. Of the 330 companies, there are only 129 companies that meet 
all the criteria. Data has collected from the company’s 2017-2018 annual report.
The effectiveness of corporate governance explains by using eight components namely 
the size of the board of directors, the independence of the board of directors, board meetings, 
financial expertise of the board of directors, the size of the audit committee, audit committee 
independence, audit committee meetings, financial expertise of the audit committee. When 
the value of each component exceeds the median value, it will indicate that the company’s 
efforts to comply with corporate governance are getting better. This condition will have an 
impact on management’s efforts to carry out corporate governance to be more effective. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness component of corporate governance will be measured using 
principal component analysis (PCA) to produce a variable.
Audit quality uses a proxy for earnings management, which using discretionary accruals 
with the Jones modification approach. Modified Jones’s model is a model widely used in 
various studies related to accounting.
The concentration of ownership illustrates the possibility that each owner has an equal 
opportunity to determine the policies that apply in the company. This study uses equity, 
which is a blockholder to measure the capacity of large shareholders and monitor controlling 
shareholders. Gama & Rodrigues (2013) explained the existence of evenly distributed 
ownership in a company could see through the difference between ownership that the high 
difference as measured by the sum of the squares of the difference between the first and 
second-largest shareholders, and the second and third largest shareholders.
In addition, this study uses the firm size control variable (ln of total assets) and leverage 
(total debts to total assets). The analysis technique used in this study is moderated regression 
analysis with the following equation:




Model 1 : Model along with independent variable AQit = α  +  β1 GCGit +  β2 sizeit + β3 levit + εit     (1)
Model 2 : Model along with moderation variable AQit= α + β1 GCGit + β2 OCit + β3 sizeit + β4 levit + εit     (2)
Model 3 : Moderated RegressionAQit = α + β1 GCGit + β2 OCit + β3 GCG*OCit + β4 Sizeit + β5 levit +εit   (3)
Result and Discussion
This research uses secondary data, which is data obtained or collected through certain 
sources. The data in this study obtained through manufacturing companies listed and 
published on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017-2018. The descriptive statistical 
results in this study show in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
DA 129 0.001241 0.117720 0.041928 0.030874
GCG 129 0.000000 1.000000 0.418487 0.208745
OC 129 -0.855625 -0.000078 -0.298254 0.270979
SIZE 129 25.798610 33.473728 29.088704 1.599521
LEV 129 0.000055 0.648789 0.118804 0.109074
Valid N (listwise) 129
Source: Data Processing
Based on the results of descriptive statistics in Table 1, it shows that the discretionary 
accrual (DA) has a minimum value of 0.001241 owned by PT Astra International Tbk in 
2018 and a maximum value of 0.117720 owned by PT Indofarma (Persero) Tbk in 2018. 
The average value of companies owned by all sample companies is 0.041928, with a standard 
deviation of 0.030874. Corporate Governance (GCG) has a minimum value of 0.00000 owned 
by PT Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk in 2018 and a maximum value of 1,0000 owned by 
PT Astra International Tbk in 2018. The average value of companies owned by all sample 
companies is 0.41848, with a standard deviation of 0.208745. The ownership concentration 
(OC) has a minimum value of -0.855625 owned by PT HM Sampoerna Tbk in 2018 and a 
maximum value of 0.000078 owned by PT Kalbe Farma Tbk in 2018. The average value of 
companies owned by all sample companies is 0.41848, with a standard deviation of 0.208745.
The size of the company has a minimum value of 25.79861 owned by PT Lionmesh 
Prima Tbk in 2018 and a maximum value of 33.447372 owned by PT Astra International 
Tbk in 2017. The average value of companies owned by all sample companies is 29.0887, 
with a standard deviation of 1.59952. Leverage (Lev) has a minimum value of 0.000055 
owned by PT Merck Tbk in 2017 and a maximum value of 0.64878 owned by PT Panasia 
Indo Resources Tbk in 2017. The average value of companies owned by all companies until 
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Table 2. Normality Test Results
Note N Kolmogorov – Smirnov Z
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) Conclusion
Model 1 105 1.140 0.149 Normal
Model 2 105 1.252 0.087 Normal
Model 3 105 1.089 0.186 Normal
Source: Data Processing
Information:
Model 1: Effect of the effectiveness of corporate governance on audit quality
Model 2: Moderation of ownership concentration on the effect of the effectiveness of 
corporate governance on audit quality
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results in Table 2 show that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
value in model 1 is 1,140 and significant at 0.149. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov value in model 
2 is 1,252 and significant at 0.087. While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov value in model 3 is 
1,089 and significant at 0.186. The results of the three models show that the linear regression 
model constructed in this study has normally distributed data. 
Table 3. Multicollinearity Test Results
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
TOL VIF TOL VIF TOL VIF
GCG 0.989 1.012 0.988 1.013 0.418 2.392
OC - - 0.878 1.139 0.143 6.997
OC*GCG - - - - 0.124 8.053
SIZE 0.864 1.157 0.837 1.194 0.837 1.194
LEV 0.872 1.146 0.768 1.303 0.762 1.313
Source: Data Processing
Table 3 shows that the independent variables used in models 1, 2, and 3 have no 
symptoms of multicollinearity between the independent variables. This result shows from 
the VIF value <10 and tolerance value> 0.1, which means there are no symptoms of 
multicollinearity.
Table 4. Heteroscedasticity Test Results
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GCG 0.326 0.192 0.099
OC - 0.089 0.572
OC*GCG - - 0.219
SIZE 0.419 0.439 0.551
LEV 0.366 0.765 0.604
Source: Data Processing




Table 4 shows that the significant value for all model variables is> 0.05. Then it can 
be concluded that all model variables are free from heteroscedasticity or do not experience 
symptoms of heteroscedasticity.
Table 5. Multiple Linear Regression Test Results
Variabel
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Sig B Sig B Sig
(Constant) 0.028 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.254 0.000
GCG 0.005 0.741 0.006 0.696 -0.026 0.266
OC - - -0.023 0.076 0.029 0.357
OC*GCG - - - - -0.127 0.073
SIZE -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.001
LEV 0.050 0.122 0.071 0.038 0.065 0.053
Source: Data Processing
Table 5 shows that corporate governance and leverage has a positive effect on audit 
quality, and concentrated ownership and size has a negative effect on audit quality. While 
hypothesis 2 states that the concentration of ownership strengthens the effect of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance on audit quality. So the second hypothesis is accepted.
Based on the results of the hypothesis testing, the first hypothesis is that corporate 
governance has a positive effect on audit quality. These results are in line with research 
conducted by Awadallah (2018). The effectiveness of corporate governance that occurs within 
the company has an impact on improving the quality of financial statements produced by 
company management. The resulting financial statements are prepared through a series of 
strict control and supervision processes so that these processes can minimize the irregularities 
that occur, and the financial statements can be following the real conditions that occur. 
The lack of irregularities in the financial statements makes it easier for external auditors to 
conduct audits so that the quality of audits produced by external auditors is of good quality 
due to the minimal possibility of irregularities committed by the company.
Based on the results carried out in hypothesis testing, stated that the second 
hypothesis is the concentration of ownership to strengthen the effect of the effectiveness 
of corporate governance on audit quality. This result is in line with what was revealed by 
AlQadasi &Abidin (2018). Efforts to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance 
require support from shareholders so that the concentration of ownership can contribute 
to the implementation of effective corporate governance. To realize effective corporate 
governance accompanied by strict supervision and control mechanisms, this can realize 
well if ownership concentration can be distributed evenly (Gama & Rodrigues, 2013). 
Support from distributed ownership evenly for the implementation of sufficient corporate 
governance forces management to demonstrate its ability to improve the quality of its 
financial statements so that the financial statements can be accounted well to the owner. 
This condition has an impact on the strength of support from ownership that is evenly 
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through the low practice of manipulation by management (Gama & Rodrigues, 2013). 
The low practice of manipulation by management makes it easy for external auditors to 
audit evidence due to the absence of data that is hidden by company management.
Conclusion
The results of this study explain that the effectiveness of corporate governance has 
a positive effect on audit quality. Companies with effective corporate governance will 
produce financial reports following the conditions that occur and are free from fraud so 
that it will make it easier for external auditors to conduct audits and produce better audit 
quality. Besides, the concentration of ownership strengthens the effect of the effectiveness of 
corporate governance on audit quality. The concentration of ownership evenly distributed 
can increase the effectiveness of corporate governance. Evenly distributed ownership will 
encourage companies to improve the quality of their financial statements. This condition 
can have an impact on improving audit quality because of the low manipulation practices 
undertaken by management. With the low manipulation, it will make it easy for external 
auditors to conduct audits of financial statements. This research implies that in order to 
minimize earnings management practices, the effectiveness of corporate governance expects 
to run well and regulate the composition of ownership into something fundamental.
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